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The Weltanschauung emerging from quantum theory clashes profoundly with our classical concepts. Quan-
tum characteristics like superposition, entanglement, wave-particle duality, nonlocality, contextuality are diffi-
cult to reconcile with our everyday intuition. In this article I survey some aspects of quantum foundations and
discuss intriguing connections with the foundations of mathematics.
I. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? (IS THERE A PROBLEM?)
From its very inception quantum mechanics generated a
fierce debate regarding the meaning of the mathematical for-
malism and the world view it provides [1–4]. The new quan-
tum Weltanschauung is characterized, on the one hand, by
novel concepts like wave-particle duality, complementarity,
superposition and entanglement, and on the other by the rejec-
tion of classical ideas such as realism, locality, causality and
non-contextuality. For instance, quantum correlations with no
causal order [5] challenge Reichenbach’s principle of com-
mon cause [6].
The disquieting feeling one has at the contact with quantum
theory was echoed by several physicists, including the found-
ing fathers: “Anyone who is not shocked by quantum mechan-
ics has not understood it” (Bohr); “I think I can safely say that
nobody understands quantum mechanics” (Feynman). Conse-
quently, there is an unsolved tension between what we predict
and what we understand [7, 8]. Although the predictions of
quantum mechanics are by far and away unmatched (in terms
of precision) by any other theory, understanding “what-all-
this-means” is lacking. Briefly, we would like to have a story
behind the data, to understand the meaning of the formalism.
There is a wide spectrum of positions concerning the prob-
lem of quantum foundations [9], with attitudes ranging from
“there is no problem, don’t waste my time” to “we do have a
problem and we don’t know how to solve it”:
Actually quantum mechanics provides a complete
and adequate description of the observed physi-
cal phenomena on the atomic scale. What else
can one wish? [10]
Quantum theory is based on a clear mathemati-
cal apparatus, has enormous significance for the
natural sciences, enjoys phenomenal predictive
success, and plays a critical role in modern tech-
nological developments. Yet, nearly 90 years af-
ter the theory’s development, there is still no con-
sensus in the scientific community regarding the
interpretation of the theory’s foundational build-
ing blocks. [11]
The confusion around the meaning of the formalism and
the lack of an adequate solution to the measurement prob-
lem (among others) resulted in a plethora of interpretations.
Apart from the (once) dominant Copenhagen interpretation –
informally known as “shut-up-and-calculate” – there are nu-
merous others: pilot wave (de Broglie-Bohm), many-worlds
[12], consistent histories [13], transactional [14], relational
[15], Ithaca, quantum Bayesianism [16] etc.
Historically, the tone of the discussion was set by the Bohr-
Einstein debate on the foundations of quantum theory [2–4].
Einstein lost the conceptual battle due to his persistence to
understand quantum phenomena in classical terms like real-
ism, locality and causality. In this respect Einstein was wrong,
but his mistake was fertile, as often happens, since the Bohr-
Einstein debate, and the ensuing EPR argument [3, 4], paved
the way for the seminal results of Bell-CHSH [17, 18] and
Kochen-Specker [19, 20]. Although Bohr was correct – one
cannot understand QM using classical notions – he was right
in an unfruitful way, as his view dominated for decades and in-
hibited any rational discussion on the foundations of QM; in
the words of Gell-Mann: “Bohr brainwashed a whole gener-
ation of physicists into thinking that the problem of quantum
mechanics has been solved” (by the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion) [21].
Nonetheless, the discussions on quantum foundations never
disappeared completely (although they were considered dis-
reputable for a long time) and at present the field enjoys a
renewed interest. This revival is due, first, to new experimen-
tal methods enabling to actually perform several Gedanken
experiments (classic as well as new ones) [22–25]. And sec-
ond, due to the recently emerged field of quantum information
and its focus on the role played by information in physical
systems. It is somehow ironic that philosophical discussions
– started almost a century ago by Bohr, Einstein and other
founding fathers – turn out to be essential nowadays in estab-
lishing the security (via Bell’s inequality violation) of real life
quantum crypto-systems.
The structure of the article is the following. I briefly re-
view the relationship between physics and mathematics, the
origin of mathematical concepts (like number, geometry etc)
and their evolution in time. Our main conjecture states that
a new quantum ontology, based on non-classical mathemat-
ical concepts, is necessary for solving the existing quantum
paradoxes and achieving a better understanding of quantum
foundations. Finally, I discuss two research directions which
could achieve this goal.
II. PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS
As discussed before, the theorems of Bell-CHSH [17, 18],
Kochen-Specker [19, 20] and Leggett-Garg [26] are major
results in quantum foundations since they reframe the prob-
lem from philosophical arguments into precise observables
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2which can be measured in the lab. These tests have been
performed numerous times and with different physical sys-
tems. The conclusion is clear: quantum experiments cannot
be explained in terms of classical desiderata such as local re-
alism (Bell-CHSH), non-contextuality (Kochen-Specker) and
macroscopic realism (Leggett-Garg).
Given this profound conflict between quantum experiments
and our intuition, it is useful to take a step back and have a
look at the structure of physical theories. One of the things
we take for granted is the fundamental role of mathematics.
Indeed, all theories have a mathematical framework in which
the observed phenomena are translated. Galileo was the first
to emphasize the crucial role played by mathematics in the
description of natural phenomena:
Philosophy is written in that great book which
ever lies before our eyes – I mean the universe
– but we cannot understand it if we do not first
learn the language and grasp the symbols, in
which it is written. This book is written in
the mathematical language, and the symbols are
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures,
without whose help it is impossible to compre-
hend a single word of it; without which one wan-
ders in vain through a dark labyrinth.
This brings us to the question: what is the origin of mathe-
matics? How do we form, how do we arrive at our mathemati-
cal concepts? For example, constructs like number, geometry
or vector space did not exist, historically, 10,000 years ago.
There are several possible answers. For a Platonist, mathe-
matical objects exist in an ideal, platonic world and we dis-
cover them by (allegedly) having access to these pre-existing
forms.
There is a second position – which we support here – re-
garding mathematical concepts. According to this ansatz,
mathematical concepts are distilled, or abstracted, from our
interaction with the external world [27] [49]. This view
has two consequences. First, it naturally answers Wigner’s
dilemma about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathemat-
ics in describing physical phenomena [28]. And second, it
provides an insight towards solving the conflict between our
classical intuition and quantum experiments. Our main math-
ematical concepts are distilled from a fundamentally classi-
cal world. As such, these constructs have a definite classical
flavour and, consequently, cannot capture irreducible quantum
aspects – after all, they were not designed to deal with these
phenomena in the first place.
Therefore we replace the question why quantum mechan-
ics is paradoxical and defies our classical intuition? by ask-
ing instead what type of mathematical concepts can we distill
from quantum experiments? This perspective shift helps us to
break away from preconceived notions inherited from classi-
cal physics. Instead of imposing classical prejudices on the
description of quantum phenomena, one aims to find the natu-
ral logico-mathematical concepts emerging from those exper-
iments.
This insight has its roots in the seminal article of Birkhoff
and von Neumann on quantum logic [29] in which they
showed that propositions about quantum particles obey a dif-
ferent type of logic. More exactly, the distributive law (valid
in classical logic) fails in quantum logic, p ∧ (q ∨ r) 6=
(p∧q)∨(p∧r). Putnam masterfully captured this perspective
shift in the title of his famous article Is logic empirical? [30].
The recent topos program [31] and the quasi-set program
[32] follow similar lines of thought. The common idea be-
hind these programs is that quantum phenomena require new
mathematical structures. The topos approach generalizes the
concept of set by using the topos category instead. In the
quasi-sets program the indistinguishability of quantum parti-
cles is build-in right from the start in the concept of quasi-set.
Other approaches include paraconsistent logic [33], many-
valued logic [34] and sheaves [35].
III. MATHEMATICS: EVOLVING CONCEPTS
The ’paradox’ is only a conflict between reality and your
feeling of what reality ’ought to be’.
Feynman
The previous ansatz and the intrusion of the empirical into
logic and set theory – the very foundations of mathematics–
is unsettling for many people. Mathematics, and even more
so logic, has still an aura of absolute truth, uncontaminated by
the contingency of real world phenomena. It is illuminating
to see in perspective how our mathematical concepts evolved
historically and how they were also shaped by our prejudices.
A textbook example are the rational numbers. For Pythago-
ras the number was, perforce, a rational number; other types
of numbers were inconceivable. Greek mathematics was
plunged into a profound crisis with the discovery that the di-
agonal of the unit square is irrational (according to the legend,
Hippasus was drowned for this discovery). For modern math-
ematics rational numbers are just one possible type of num-
bers, among others. So from our perspective it is difficult to
understand the depth of the crisis.
Two key ideas of Pythagorean philosophy will clarify this
difficulty. First, for Pythagoras the universe is a Kosmos,
therefore ordered, harmonious (in opposition to Chaos). And
second, the number is the measure of everything. As a con-
sequence, any two numbers should be commensurable, hence
their ratio has to be a rational number. In a Kosmos everything
should be expressed as a rational number, since only commen-
surable quantities can exist.
This reveals the dynamics of the paradox. A preconceived
idea (the universe is ordered, a Kosmos) has a logical conse-
quence that all quantities (e.g., lengths) should be commen-
surable. A Kosmos, by definition, cannot have incommensu-
rable lengths.
Interestingly, we can find echoes of this conceptual crisis in
everyday language. From a purely technical term with a pre-
cise meaning – a number which is not a ratio of two integers
– irrational became a cognitive attribute. The link between
the two meanings (mathematical and cognitive) is straightfor-
ward. For Pythagoreans, an irrational number is an incon-
ceivable concept, which cannot be thought of logically (i.e.,
3rationally). Ironically, today one can logically prove theorems
about irrational numbers (a clearly rational activity).
A similar evolution happened repeatedly in the history of
mathematics. Before the discovery of complex numbers it
was impossible to imagine a number whose square is nega-
tive (hence imaginary number). Likewise, Euclidean geome-
try reigned supreme for more than two millennia. Euclidean
geometry was the geometry, the only (logically) possible one.
One can hardly underestimate this prejudice – even Gauss
(known as Princeps mathematicorum) hesitated to publish his
ideas about non-Euclidean geometry. Today, Euclidean geom-
etry is just one possible geometry, among others.
The message thus becomes apparent: whenever we stumble
upon a paradox, we need to critically examine our prejudices
and be ready to extend our concepts.
IV. REALISM: FROM CLASSICAL TO QUANTUM
When it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in
poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned with
describing facts as with creating images and establishing
mental connections.
Bohr
Let us consider now the problem of realism. Classical sys-
tems are endowed with well-defined properties and a mea-
surement only reveals them, ideally without changing them.
This is, in essence, classical realism: systems have intrinsic,
pre-existing attributes which are independent of the measur-
ing apparatus. Thus one can talk about the objects possessing
the properties.
This intuition is challenged by quantum experiments, via
Bell-CHSH, Kochen-Specker and Leggett-Garg theorems.
There are several statements in the literature along these lines:
quantum mechanics forces us to abandon realism, quantum
systems do not have pre-existing properties, the measurement
creates the properties. These statements are in a sense true, but
also somehow vague, resulting in several misleading claims.
In the following we aim to clarify these aspects.
First, quantum mechanics does not compel us to abandon
realism understood in a very broad sense: there is a world
out-there. There is no need to fall into solipsism or sub-
jectivism. Notwithstanding certain (unwarranted) claims like
“consciousness collapses the wave-function”, quantum me-
chanics does not deny the existence of an external reality.
Without this minimal notion of reality one cannot do science,
and even less predict or talk about what the Universe looked
like before Earth and human observers came into existence.
We adopt the following definition of realism:
There exists an external world independent of our
consciousness, but not (necessarily) of our actions.
A second, rough-and-ready notion of realism is: something is
real if I can kick it and it kicks back. Thus I can talk about an
electron being real, since I can kick it (change its state with
an external field) and it kicks back (it emits bremsstrahlung
radiation).
True, quantum reality is a very different beast from the
classical world – certain aspects are affected by our actions
and thus one can roughly talk about the non-existence of pre-
defined properties. In this sense a measurement “brings into
existence” these attributes.
Second, quantum objects – photons, electrons, protons –
do have certain intrinsic properties (thus invariant upon mea-
surement). Electric charge, total spin, rest mass, leptonic and
baryonic numbers are such examples. The very fact that one
can talk about a photon versus an electron shows that these
two entities are different and can be differentiated based on
certain characteristics. An electron has always an electric
charge e and spin- 12 , whereas a photon is always chargeless
and has spin-1. Without the existence of certain intrinsic prop-
erties words like “photon”, “electron” or “proton” would be
meaningless.
Nevertheless, it is also true that quantum systems do not
have, prior to measurement, other type of properties, like the
spin component on a given axis (e.g., Sz). For an electron,
measuring the spin component along a direction n will ran-
domly produce either +1 or -1 (in units of ~2 ). Thus the spin
component is not predefined, does not exist prior to the mea-
surement; equivalently, the measurement does not reveal a
pre-existing attribute.
In the classical world the measurement is passive, like read-
ing a book (pre-existing text). In the quantum realm the mea-
surement is active, it elicits an answer. We probe the system
and we obtain an answer according to the question we ask
– there is no answer before asking the question. This is the
meaning of Peres dictum “unperformed experiments have no
results” [36].
There is an interesting twist to the previous statement,
namely quantum-controlled experiments [24]. In this case one
can have the answer before we know the question, but the an-
swer has to be consistent with the subsequently revealed ques-
tion. As a result, we need to interpret what we measure. In
other words, the answer (the measurement result) is meaning-
less without the context (the question asked).
The difference between classical and quantum view of re-
ality can be summarized as follows:
classical: reality = pre-existing ⇒ measurement reveals
quantum: reality 6= pre-existing ⇒ measurement creates
Recently, Kochen [37] attempted to clarify this confusing
state of affairs by drawing a distinction between two types of
properties: intrinsic and extrinsic (relational). Intrinsic prop-
erties are familiar from everyday (classical) world, where at-
tributes are intrinsic. On the other hand, extrinsic, or relational
properties depend on the measurement performed on the sys-
tem (e.g., in quantum experiments) [50].
A. A metaphor
Extrinsic properties may seem counterintuitive from a clas-
sical perspective. Inspired by the previous quote from Bohr,
we aim to make this quantum behaviour a bit less mysterious
with the help of a metaphor.
4Suppose we have a glass cube – this is a well-defined
macroscopic object and has well-defined classical properties.
What colour is the cube? If we observe it with a red laser,
it appears red; if we examine it with a blue laser, it appears
blue. Clearly, colour is not a pre-existing attribute of the cube,
but depends on the measuring device (the colour of the laser).
The cube is colourless, but this does not make the cube less
real. However, this metaphor does not capture very well the
behaviour of a quantum spin.
So let’s complicate a bit the picture. Assume now we have
a cube made of (a hypothetical) quantum-glass, or qlass. The
quantum-glass has a light-sensitive dye with a peculiar prop-
erty: if we illuminate it with a laser of colour c, the qlass
colour randomly becomes either c or c (the complementary
color in the RGB space). Thus, if we observe the qlass cube
with a red laser, the cube will randomly appear either red or
cyan; if we observe it with a blue laser, it will randomly appear
either blue or yellow. The probabilities of the two occurrences
are determined by the initial state of the qlass cube.
We can extend this metaphor to include, for example, an en-
tangled pair of quantum-glass cubes. In this case, even if the
two cubes are spatially separated, when we probe them with
lasers of the same color c, they will glow in random, but al-
ways opposite colours c and c. For space-like separated mea-
surements, Bell-CHSH theorem ensures us that neither pre-
existing properties, nor signalling can explain the magnitude
of the experimental correlations.
B. A realism revival
The state of a quantum system is fully specified by its wave-
function ψ. In contrast to classical physics, ψ predicts only the
probabilities for different measurement results, and not the in-
dividual outcomes.
This brings us to a crucial question behind Bohr-Einstein
debate, namely how to interpret the wavefunction. Is ψ re-
lated merely to our incomplete knowledge of the system (the
ψ-epistemic view)? Or does ψ correspond to an objective
property of the system (the ψ-ontic view)?
Recently the ψ-ontic vs. ψ-epistemic problem [38] became
a very active topic in quantum foundations. In a seminal ar-
ticle Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) proved that quantum
mechanics is incompatible with ψ-epistemic models, if we as-
sume preparation independence [39]. The PBR theorem was
hailed as the most important result in quantum foundations
since Bell’s inequality. However, it also generated a heated
debate with several articles criticizing its assumptions and de-
fending the ψ-epistemic interpretation.
Significantly, the PBR result reopened the discussion re-
garding the meaning of the wavefunction. In the wake of
the PBR article other no-go theorems for ψ-epistemic mod-
els have been proved starting from different assumptions. By
assuming free-choice, Colbeck and Renner proved that the
wavefunction of a system is in one-to-one correspondence
with its elements of reality [40, 41]. Patra et al. [42] derived
a no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic models starting from conti-
nuity and weak separability; this was tested experimentally in
[43].
Thus the wavefunction cannot be viewed only as a state of
knowledge, but is directly related to objective attributes of the
system [44]. In view of these results, the ψ-epistemic interpre-
tation becomes increasingly difficult to defend. In a way, this
mirrors the downfall of hidden-variables theories after Bell-
CHSH theorem.
The question now is: what are the implications for realism
if the wavefunction is indeed related to objective attributes of
a quantum system – or, assuming free-choice, ψ is in one-
to-one correspondence with its elements of reality [40]? We
address this question in the next section.
C. Realism, but not the way we know it
In classical physics ontological existence is in one-to-one
correspondence with measurable, pre-existing properties: “if
I can measure it, it’s real; if I can’t measure it, it’s not”. In
addition, these pre-existing properties are described by real
numbers, or n-tuples of real numbers (vectors, tensors, quater-
nions etc) [51].
In quantum mechanics this is no longer the case. The wave-
function ψ determines probabilistically the measurement out-
comes (the “properties”), but collapses after measurement.
Moreover, Kochen-Specker theorem implies that quantum
mechanics is contextual: the measurement results depend
on the context, i.e., on the other compatible observables co-
measured with it.
Recall the previous discussion about the two meanings of
rational/irrational: a mathematical one (ratio of two integers)
and a cognitive one. One can detect a similar dynamics here,
with real having again two distinct meanings: mathematical
(real as a number, the power of continuum c = 2ℵ0 ) and ex-
istential (real as in existing-out-there). In a certain sense, we
subconsciously equate reality (ontological existence) with at-
tributes possessing real values. I think this preconception pre-
vents us from overcoming the actual crisis of quantum foun-
dations. Thus, in order to comprehend quantum phenom-
ena we need to extend our concept of reality by looking for
novel mathematical structures beyond that of real numbers. In
essence, we have to stop identifying reality with real numbers,
i.e., real-valued pre-existing properties.
The recent theorems of Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph [39] and
Colbeck-Renner [40, 41] imply that, for quantum systems
The wavefunction ψ is real, the properties are not.
Accordingly, only the wavefunction ψ has ontological exis-
tence. The measurement results (what classically one would
call properties), like the spin projection on a given axis, are
not pre-existing prior to the observation, and thus are not re-
vealed by the measurement. In contrast to the classical case,
for quantum systems the “properties” are created by the act of
measurement. However, since ψ is not directly measurable,
this is clearly a weaker form of (ontological) existence than
the classical one.
The outcome of a quantum measurement depends on two
factors: (i) the wavefunction ψ prior to the measurement, and
5(ii) the measured observable. The outcome itself does not
have an objective existence before the measurement. This
relates to Kochen’s relational (extrinsic) properties discussed
above.
Metaphorically, the measurement results are like different
shadows of a three-dimensional object [45]: they reveal in-
formation about the underlying reality, but there are not, by
themselves, objective properties of this reality (that is, prior
to the collapse, see below). The shadow depends both on the
object (the wavefunction) and on the viewing angle (the type
of measurement we perform). For example, depending on the
direction, a cylinder can appear as a disk, as a rectangle, or as
anything in between (morphing) [24]. Obviously, the cylin-
der is neither a disk, nor a rectangle – it’s a three-dimensional
object transcending its shadows.
However, a quantum measurement is active, not passive –
the measurement changes what we measure. In tune with the
previous metaphor, the object transforms into (becomes) its
shadow after looking at it – this is the collapse of the wave-
function.
To date we don’t have a definite answer to the question:
what mathematical structure emerges from quantum experi-
ments and can serve as a basis for a quantum ontology? The
problem is still open, notwithstanding several attempts like
quantum logic [29], topos theory [31], quasisets [32], sheaves
[35], paraconsistent logic [33] and many-valued logic [34].
Quantum logic has been around for more than 70 years, but it
yielded few results. Topos theory and quasisets are still in the
beginning and until now they produced no breakthroughs.
To end on a more speculative note, I sketch two research di-
rections which can spur the development of a future quantum
ontology.
The first is to reconsider the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) ax-
ioms of set theory in the context of quantum mechanics. The
ZF axioms are based on classical intuitions (distinguisha-
bility, intrinsic properties etc) which appear inappropriate
to describe indistinguishable quantum particles without pre-
existing properties. A specific example is how to make sense
of the Axiom of separation in the context of non-commuting
observables and extrinsic properties.
A second line of research is related to Cantor continuum
hypothesis: there are no sets with cardinality between ℵ0 and
2ℵ0 . Go¨del and Cohen proved the independence of the con-
tinuum hypothesis from the ZFC axioms (ZF with choice).
Consequently, one can construct non-Cantorian sets for which
the continuum hypothesis is false – this clearly mirrors non-
Euclidean geometries in which the parallel postulate does not
hold.
Consider now a spin-12 : the wavefunction is continuous, but
the measurement outcomes are always discrete. Moreover, the
wavefunction collapses after the measurement. In this context
it will be interesting to see if a non-Cantorian set (with cardi-
nality between ℵ0 and 2ℵ0 ) is more appropriate to capture this
quantum behaviour.
We expect that novel mathematical structures (e.g., non-
Cantorian sets, non-classical logic etc) will provide an on-
tological basis for quantum foundations. This new ontology
will hopefully solve the quantum paradoxes [46, 47], on the
one hand, and provide a deeper understanding of quantum me-
chanics, on the other.
Historically a similar change happened with the advent of
general relativity, which replaced the classical structure of Eu-
clidean geometry with Riemannian geometry. Non-Euclidean
geometry provided general relativity (GR) with both an ade-
quate ontology and a new metaphor, the dynamical interplay
between spacetime an matter: “spacetime tells matter how to
move; matter tells spacetime how to curve” [48]. The power-
ful visual impact of this metaphor generated an intuitive un-
derstanding of general relativity. This explains why there are
no (deep, unsolved) foundational problems in GR compared
to QM.
V. DISCUSSION
Like seeds leaving a tree, mathematical concepts have a life
of their own, departing from their roots, but still keeping an
imprint of their origin. One can thus speak of the ontological
continuity of mathematical concepts: however abstract or far
from reality a mathematical construct might seem, it still has
a link, an umbilical cord, to something “existing out-there”.
The main intuition behind this article is a conjecture regard-
ing the nature of mathematical concepts and their role in ex-
plaining the external world. The ansatz and its consequences
can be summarized as follows:
1. Mathematical concepts and structures are distilled from our
interaction with the external world.
2. Classical concepts – realism, causality, locality and Aris-
totelian logic – emerge as structures of a classical universe.
Like Euclidean geometry or rational numbers, classical logic
is fine per se, as a mathematical structure. However, it is not
an adequate model for the quantum world.
3. Paradoxes signal a conflict between reality and our expec-
tations (prejudices) of what reality “should be” (Feynman).
4. Quantum experiments compel us to abandon local realism,
causality and non-contextuality. Consequently, we need novel
mathematical and logical structures more adequate to describe
quantum reality.
We envision that mystifying quantum characteristics (con-
textuality, nonlocality, the failure of classical realism, collapse
of the wavefunction etc) will emerge naturally as different
facets of the same underlying structure, which will form the
basis of a new quantum ontology. Despite several attempts in
this direction, such a unifying concept is still lacking.
These are interesting times for quantum foundations. We
expect the centenary of quantum theory to bring forth not only
6quantum technologies, but also a genuine understanding and
a new quantum ontology.
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